Since the 1990s, the French and the Swedish welfare system have been reformed. France choose to do in three distinct ways: reducing social security deficits by increasing social contribution for both employer and employee social contributions; controlling spending through cutbacks of social programs; and trying to move from a bismarckian Welfare State to an universal one. During the 1990's the Swedish health and social care systems underwent reforms and were opened up to private sector, competition and free choice on the part of users.
These reforms represented, in both countries, a break with the values that had previously guided welfare service provision. In the end, the question is wether France and Sweden have managed to preserve their egalitarian character... or not.
“Today, Sweden was crumbling all around him, like a gigantic pile of planks. And nobody knew who was the carpenter waiting for in the entrance to put it together again”
Henning Mankell Villospår (1995)
In August 1992, in a sociology conference named “Europe a challenged to the Scandinavian Model of Welfare” Peter Abrahamson stated : “The social-democratic or Scandinavian Model is the luxury edition of the liberal or Beveridge model and the catholic model is the discount edition of the Bismarck or conservative model”. In the end of the 2010’s, all these differents models of Welfare State have underwent deep transformation. Therefore, it could be interesting to analyse if the French and Swedish Welfare State model are still the same after this decade of unrest. Have these models lost their characteristics? Can we discern a convergence of these models towards the liberal welfare model or the universal one?
It is not the expenditure level which characterize the Swedish Welfare State, but rather the way in which it has institutionalized the values of universalism and social egalitarianism (Esping-Andersen, 1990). That's why we have to ask ourselves if the Swedish Welfare State has lost its universalist and egalitarian feature.
“Ten years ago, the State was largely regarded as an instrument intended to solve the problems, today for very many people, the problem is the State itself”[1]. This formula of Charles Schultze, Jimmy Carter's former economic adviser, summarizes the current revival of liberal ideas. The return of liberalism and the European debt crisis are the two faces of the same coin : a context in which the Welfare State’s bases are deeply affected, and this as well in Sweden as in France. Initially, it is appropriate to study in detail the crisis and particularly the legitimacy and spiritual crisis of the Welfare State. Then, to explore the types of reforms implemented in the two countries in a comparative perspectives; And in the end, to draw up the assessment of these reforms and if they have changed the Welfare State nature of each countries.
How financial crisis challenge the Welfare state
With the beginning of the year 90’s, The Swedish Welfare State model underwent a deep questioning. In the 1990s Sweden went through a deep economic recession accompanied by a massive increase in unemployment and a rapidly growing budget deficit. The crisis had large repercussions for the welfare of many citizens and it generated cutbacks in virtually all social policy programmes. The financial crisis halted a welfare state expansion that had been going on for decades. It also caused great concern about the state of welfare of the nation. In 1999 the Swedish Government appointed a ‘Welfare Commission’, a team of academic researchers who were assigned the task of drawing up a balance sheet for the development of welfare in the 1990s.
The Welfare State was always attacked and vilified by certain interests. But a social compromise existed as well for its existence as for its growth. What changes, it is that these attacks finds echoes in a new public opinion sector that were formerly interested in the Welfare State progression. In other words, there is intersection between right criticisms and left dissatisfactions.
In France, the financial crisis of 2007-2008 threats the ‘old’ welfare edifice at exactly the moment when french government wants to adapt the welfare state to major structural challenges like equity, social sustainability and population ageing.
Three elements of analysis are generally proposed to formulate the diagnosis of the French Welfare state crisis: a financial dead end, its economic efficiency and finally its development opposed by certain cultural changes in progress.
The financial crisis.
The growth rate of the public expenditure of social policies and the mechanisms of redistribution is currently much faster than the GDP. The tax burdens (i.e., the share of taxes in national income) have increased enormously throughout this century reaching levels of around 46,1 percent of GDP in France . This raise seems to have no limit and it is interesting to compare these levels with those prevailing at the beginning of this century when the French economist, Paul Leroy-Beaulieu wrote that taxes above 12 percent of national income would be "exorbitant" and damaging to the growth prospects of countries. Leroy-Beaulieu was concerned about levels of taxation which, by today’s standards, would be considered as extremely low. He would probably react with incredulity to levels as high as 50 percent of GDP or even more.
The efficiency crisis
In a more and more globalize economy this is the end of the Keynesianism mechanism of regulation. Indeed, the ideas of Keynesianism which have dominated economic policy and accompanied the development of the Welfare State are based on the principle of “closed economies” and the principal instruments are “national demand”, “national offer” and the saving and the redistribution made for the households. Thus, in any case the Keynesianism reasons in “opened economies”, the theory does not take indeed account of foreign trade, or overseas investment. Lastly, this blocking of the Keynesian equation appears initially through the considerable reduction of the effects on growth by the “reflationary” measures with investment or consumption because of “external pressure ". This could be sum up by the provocative statement from Emmanuel Macron “We put a crazy amount of dough into our social benefits and poor people are still poor,”
The legitimacy crisis
The welfare state which for 40 years had had succeeds in banishing the spectrum of the disease, unemployment and social risks in France suddenly faced to severe criticisms. Then, like had noted John Logue in 1979 in a very lightening article we can say that the “welfare State is victim of its success”[3], or is it necessary it to seek elsewhere the theological reasons of its crisis? The doubt about the Welfare state is not only related to the economic problems of regulation. It is not the extension of the State or the weight of welfare expenditures which really matter. This doubt expresses a major shock, the transformation of the relation between State and Civil society. Thus, Pierre Rosanvallon distinguishes four form of the crisis or what he called “doubt about equality”.
The question of security and the emergence of the State-guard typology which tends to become increasingly central. Physical safety in the big cities, the assertion of the force vis-à-vis international situation of instability became important stakes for citizens. The request for safety tends to weaken the request for equality.
The Welfare State progressed neither by the calculation of the “bourgeoisie”, nor by the conquest of new rights by workers. The contributions increased without being reformulated with social compromise. This give the impression for citizens of an inescapable movement towards increasingly bureaucracy without the perception of any concrete benefit or breakthrough.
the tear of the “veil of the ignorance”[4] of John Rawls, the small inequalities appear very unfair for the middle-class (people pay income tax) which was the traditional support of the Welfare State and are increasingly informed about the dissimulated incomes of these neighbours or where their money is dedicated. Therefore they are less inclined to pay for someone “than they don’t not know”.
The society is more and more segmented we can notice a “balkanisation” of the society under the pressure of economic structures. On a hand, the important stake now is not any more to be protected by the Welfare state but to be located in the most favourable segment of the society. On the other hand, the State also contributes to make the society more “corporatist”. The French Welfare state Conservatist origin has produced some unintended negative effects, for example it cannot base his global Reform around an overall compromise, because he had multiplied the socio-professional categories and the social insurance schemes, he had to negotiate special social arrangements with each groups. This latter feature is a source of conflict and social tension behind categories but also across categories, with this question: who are the privileged people? Who are the losers?
How Economic problems leads to a shift in political ideology
In the beginning of the nineties, Sweden was confronted to a real crisis. In the 1980s, a real estate and financial bubble formed, driven by a rapid increase in lending. Then, a restructuring of the tax system, in order to emphasize low inflation combined with an international economic slowdown in the early the 1990s, caused the bubble to burst. Between 1990 and 1993 GDP fell by 5% and unemployment skyrocketed, causing the worst economic crisis in Sweden since the 1930s. Total employment fell by almost 10% during the crisis. In two years, the national production decreased dramatically and the deficit of public finances had become abyssal in addition to, all these elements occurred in the context of war in the Balkans and Sweden has to face one of the most important waves of immigration since 1945. Like Joakim Palme notes it “at all every levels Sweden has underwent a crisis”[5].
A major shift in political ideology.
Twaddle[6] wants to understand why the Sweden sought major reforms in a system that he judged to be, arguably, the best in the world and why the reforms took the direction of market principles, privatization of service and decentralization—just the opposite of the direction associated with their previous successes.
Twaddle considers alternative explanations of why the various reforms introduced since 1980, might have taken place: Even thought, there were obviously problems with the Swedish Welfare State system; problems with the general economy one of the main explanation remain the shifts in the political ideology.
Indeed the author says that economic dimension and dysfunction “were not sufficient to explain the change in direction of the reform effort”. He suggests that these problems could be “fixed” within the traditional Swedish public welfare system. Sweden had more success than other countries in containing the costs of Welfare expenditure during the 1980s mostly with their traditional system in place. The political crisis can explain the changes in the Swedish Welfare State in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Indeed the weakness of the Social Democratic Party drew back from its long-term commitments to equality, solidarity and planning allowing the right-wing to advocate their programs of markets, competition and privatization. “With the 1991 election, a new, aggressive, anti-welfare-state set of policies could be implemented with no more than token opposition” (p. 206).
There is a debate about the welfare state and its future and some awkward questions are being posed in public. Indeed at the Swedish Social Democratic Party congress in April 1996, at which he was elected Goran Pearsson the future prime minister of Sweden, this latter claimed “ a new Swedish model” and he added “ we cannot for a long maintain our Welfare state with loans from the international money markets”. Obviously, in a strategic way to have the support of the Centre Party he insisted that Sweden have to become the first country in Europe to build an “ecologically sustainable society”.
In addition to among the population there is a growing recognition of three central questions stemming from the fact that the welfare State is too expensive.
How to make work more attractive and remove some of the disincentives built into the income security schemes?
How to improve cost efficiency in the local provision of Welfare Service?
How to manage the Welfare system so as to remedy the deficiencies in budgetary planning procedures?
Marklund observed that this Thirsty years of Swedish reforms have a consequence of increased inequality between social groups, support for the public welfare State was decreasing. He said that the “the idea of welfare according to need has been at least partly replaced by incentive oriented policies”
In spite of a different history and welfare state model both France and Sweden pursue the same kind of reform. These include the importance of government intervention in the different tools of the Welfare Sate to ensure universal coverage, the key role of primary care in ensuring access to basic health services and in containing costs. France is about to create a universal retirement system where one euro of contribution gives the same pension rights, whenever it has been paid, whatever the status of the person. And guess what ? The supporters of this major systemic reforms found inspiration from the swedish experience in the end of the nineties when the country mooved from annuity to nontionnal account.
The pace and scope of reform are significantly affected by the political process in each country. If Sweden succeeded in some way in doing the necessary reforms during the 90’s, France France seems to encounter some difficulties in reforming its Bismarckian welfare systems. Successive governments since 2000 have oscillated between liberal reforms and increasing the degree of universality without really choosing a real path.
In Sweden the conservatives under Carl Bildt had since the late 1980’s claimed for a “change of the system” with tax and privatization. Interestingly, the return to office of a social democratic government in Sweden in 1994 intensified fiscal austerity and it was clear that the ruling party had perforce to adapt to the realities of European Economic integration and the need to enhance national competitiveness in the teeth of stiff global competition. The 1997 Swedish budget cut parental and dental benefits whilst housing allowance for retired person were also squeezed. David Arter said that “certainly terms such as “decentralization”, “the poverty trap” and “work incentives” formed part of Swedish Social Democrats rhetoric en the late 1990.”[7]
Reform within the Welfare State during the ninety’s started with the decentralization of regulatory power to the country councils, which made it legally possible for them to experiment with new organizational form of service provision.
County councils negotiated themselves the cost and the quantity of services to be offered to the public through contracts. Thus, for the public services providers this meant that they were made “organizationally independent” and were founded on the basis of performance rather than budgets”[8]..
Reducing social security deficits : plans for balancing the Sécurité Sociale budget
Since 2008 mounting deficits and perverse labour market effects have highlighted the need for reform in France. The financial burden of the welfare state has been mainly concentrated in the pension sector. But public opinion has proven to be strongly attached to current pension arrangements. Until 1993, various marginal measures (Plans de redressement des comptes de la sécurité sociale) were limited “to increasing contributions to balance the social budget” [9] . Attempts to realise a general reform of the pension system were blocked. At the beginning of the 1990s, the debate on pensions was centred on the Socialist Rocard government’s 1991 White Paper. Both left-wing and right-wing parties agreed on the following:
1. The need to strengthen and adapt the French model of capitalism to new international circumstances due to economic stagnation and a high rate of unemployment (economic competitiveness).
2. That the French welfare state was a source of social exclusion and ineffective in helping system outsiders (equity).
3. The need to reduce social security deficits (financial viability). These could no longer be corrected simply by increasing social contributions.
4. The need perceived by some politicians and bureaucrats to reduce the role of the social partners. Their managerial role was increasingly seen as a source of inefficiency and increasing welfare costs (effectiveness).
Indeed the successive governments tried to make more logical our tax structure in making finance the whole system by a universal or broad solidarity contribution with tax, come from the incomes of households or companies. But this last point is often difficult to implement, on the one hand because the French citizens are increasingly reluctant to pay new taxes when their incomes are now stagnated, and on the other hand, these reforms come up against the internal problems of these big administrations which are not inclined to change quickly.[10]
Another important Stake was to find a new way of financing social security systems which have became increasingly expensive. Since the Nineties, these revamps have primarily tried to support employment by decreasing the burden of the contribution comes from work activity.[11]
It is the economic context which leads France to modify its policy of social protection by implementing of social services reduction policies in particular for the state pension scheme. But, in 1995, 2003 and even 2007 these revamps provoked a strong discontentment among the population and the government have to step back face to “the mobilisation of the street”.
Resorting to the market :European contraints and public services in France
During the nineties, the public welfare service sector opened up to competing private actors. As a result, the share of private provision grew, both within the health-care and primary education systems as well as within social service provision.
Today, according to the liberals, the introduction of competition in the public services (EDF, GDF, La Poste, the SNCF and the RATP, France telecom, etc) would be in conformity with the general interest. The deregulation of public services indicates the introduction of competition into sectors where public monopolies had been made up, often in the middle of the 20th century, for largely justified reasons at this moment. For the liberals, these reasons are not valid any more today. Several arguments are advanced. Firstly, they affirm the superiority of competition on monopoly as regards its capacity to keep the price low, to boost productivity and innovation. The second great justification of the deregulation, is based on the fact that these services knew since the 1980’s major technological innovations which questioning the theory of natural monopoly as the main justification of the public administration management.
However the opponents claim that competition is not always the best way of stimulating quality, and it results in impoverishing the public service missions. As Albert Hirschmann[12], the capacity of a public monopoly to take care of the performance and quality depends on the fact that the customers or users can make themselves heard, via various channels (associations, political mediations…).
This is the extension of democratic principle to the public services. Then, resorting to competition would provoke a major risk for the “services of general interest”. The result can be the accentuation of social dualism in the social access to certain fundamental services: while wealthy users turn to private and expensive services, poor people remain in a public service which is increasingly degraded. In other words, we obtain “a two speed system of services” and the end of citizens’ equality toward services.
The Process of Privatization.
The transformation of the Swedish public sectors over the last decades and in particular the changes for employees in health care due to privatization, unbundling and decentralization of labour relations. Thornqvist and Christer[13] explain that the public sector in Sweden is on the one hand highly influenced by a neo-classical economic paradigm and an international management discourse.
Yet, on the other, due to its historical roots (i.e. path dependency), social partnership and collective bargaining has to a large extent survived the ideological challenges. Some major changes have however taken place within the frames of the collective bargaining system and one of the most important ones is the growing difficulty for groups of employees in the public sector to keep up with the wage development in private-owned firms.
It is according to the authors the very much a result of the neo-classical dominance in the view of services; this view states that services are best managed in the same way and according to the “same principles as a company in manufacturing is run”[14].
French and Swedish welfare state are highly resilient to cutbacks
In Sweden, the debate is more focusing on knowing if after the reform, the Swedish Welfare State system remain Universalistic and have not betrayed its principles than its new efficiency. Whereas in France, after the mitigated result of reforms consisting in increasing and changing the nature of the receipts, the debate is now on the possible cut back of Welfare expenditure?
In Sweden, opinions are divided on the question.
The question here is simple; could it be that convergence between West European Welfare Models is taking place, with the Swedish model losing some of its special feature?
It was perhaps significant that Staffan Marklund[15] in his investigation of the Swedish Welfare State had spoken of a case of “Paradise Lost”. But one may asked what is reality?
Above all, idealised picture of the Swedish Welfare system should be avoided. As Bo Rothsein[16], has noted, three decades after the comprehensive school reform, no improvement has taken place in the rate of social recruitment to higher education in Sweden. Secondly, under the impact of the internationalisation of capital and post-Fordist changes in production, the Swedish Social Democrats model abandoned the overall Rehn-Meidner model when they returned in power in1982, thus, deep changes have occurred before the nineties, because the two main principles consist in keeping corporate profits low and promoting a solidaristic wage policy were already held no longer to be viable.
The political challenges of the Swedish Welfare State have been primarily linked with alternation in power. The advent of the non-socialist government represented something of an ideological change to the universalist concept and created cracks in the old consensus.
The point should not be exaggerated, since it could equally been argued that necessity was in large part the mother of a more marked oriented approach. Nonetheless, new rules of entitlement and means-testing, particularly in relation to unemployment and sickness benefits and housing allowances have appeared to violate the “disadvantage consensus”.
The Swedish welfare state has been and is still undergoing a transforming process whereby it risks losing one of its main characteristics, namely the belief in and institutional support for social egalitarianism. This resulted in a socially segregating dynamic, prompted by the introduction of “consumer choice”. Indeed, the gradual privatization and market-orientation of the welfare services undermine previous Swedish notions of a “people’s home”, where uniform, high-quality services are provided by the state to all citizens, regardless of income, social background or cultural orientation.
So we cannot said that the Swedish Welfare State has completely changed, in respect of the socio-economic challenges facing it in future, it may be regarded as, at least in part, a victim of its own success. Across Sweden, declining birth rates and increased life expectancy levels will alter the age structure of the population and this will have deleterious cost complication for the Welfare State. In particular, the old age dependence ratio, the population dependent on income transfers as a percentage of the working age population will increase by a substantial amount, and this will have a considerable impact on Welfare expenditure particularly on social transfers, pensions and “merit goods”.
Did the Swedish Welfare State has lost its characteristics?
According to Magnus Falkehed in its pamphlet “le modèle suédois” he stated that even thought Sweden is become again a flourishing model at the end of decade 90 it was the price of a major changes of its bases. Then, he adds “from now on an important part of the civil servants consists in doing invitations to tender and comparing estimates, then to take care, as far as possible, of the signed contracts the good application of the signed contracts. Thus the civil servant became a management controller, the citizens a consumer of services, the doctors a producer of care, the vice-chancellor of university a chairman and the user a customer”[17]. But let’s leave this caricatured version for really studying the issued of the debate.
Paula blomquist[18] argue that, wit this new “mix” of public and private service producers (childcare, elder care, primary education, health care) and its increasingly stratified service consumption patterns, the Swedish welfare state is currently assuming a less traditionally social democratic character ,and becoming more like the continental European welfare states.
Privatization will assume “an ever deeper and, with regard to the goal of social equality, an ever more detrimental form”. If a commercial market for high-quality private social services develops, the better-off might be inclined to pay for these services privately rather than wait for public authorities to “purchase” them on their behalf. This will, by definition, undermine political attempts to maintain a universal, egalitarian welfare services sector and create a “a segmentation” among the members of the same society.
On the Other hand, according to Anders Lindblom[19], the Welfare State is highly resilient to cutbacks. Cuts are very unpopular among voters and therefore very dangerous for politicians or other parties that aspire to be re-elected.
Even though the Swedish Welfare State was reformed in many ways in the nineties and some cutbacks were made, the welfare State has not been dismantled. Its major attributes, when compared to other countries, its generosity, universality and developed Welfare State services are almost as prominent as before the crisis.
For them, the question whether the Swedish State can no long be described as a social democratic Welfare State is, at least, partly, the same question as whether the Swedish Welfare State has been dismantled. Because according to Lindblom, Welfare retrenchment signifies more than just a quantitative change. Retrenchment signifies a qualitative change in the Welfare State. So it is difficult to conclude to a convergence between the Swedish Welfare State Model and the Liberal one!
The basic difference between them is that whereas the liberal Regime provides for the poor alone according to a principle of need and lets the middle class turned to private insurance schemes; the social democratic regimes serve all citizens according to more generous, middle class standards. Broader coverage and higher standards of course imply higher standards expenditures, which, is however increasingly hard to finance as tax bases become mobile.
Therefore, according to globalization theory, we would expect the social democratic regime to be under heavy pressure to converge towards liberal regime, but it has not happened. Although Welfare services have experienced major organizational Reform and private production has increased, but services are still publicly financed and regulated.
France: how difficult is it to reform a Bismarckian welfare systems?
Historically, the relationship between social partners and the state in France has been particularly difficult. Institutional weaknesses and the ideological fragmentation of the labour movement have made it difficult to achieve a genuine social dialogue. This was as true of the 1990s as it was of previous decades when agreements between the government and social actors on pensions proved to be impossible.
The case of pension reform in France suggests some broader conclusions about the new politics of pensions in the kind of Fench Bismarckian Welfare State. The first relate to the pension policy network and reform goals. Bonoli[20] was the first to recognise that the main cleavage in Bismarckian pension’s policy has not been within the party system, but between political actors and social partners.
The second problem that prevents the successive government to reform the French Social Welfare State is due to the structure and stratification of this one. Indeed, each Reform tends to discriminate a category of the population because there is no unification of the different schemes. There is today still no administrative unification of the various modes; many special insurance schemes remain (farmers, EGF, civil servants) with the general schemes. According to Esping-Andersen typology it is one of the main distinct features of a Conservatism Social policy: “either because of State recognition of particular privileges, or because organized groups refused to be part of a more status inclusive legislation, there emerged the tradition of constructing a myriad of Status differentiated with social insurance schemes, each with its particular rules, finances and benefit structure”[21]. Therefore, the Universalist Swedish Welfare State Model appears more flexible in its capacity to change and absorb the change than the French Welfare State. This latter seemed to show modest capacities for restructuring and are considered to be sclerotic or “frozen welfare states”[22].
The French Welfare State has evolved in some way under the effects of cutbacks in the social security scheme, the implementation of universalistic structural change (PUMA- Universal health coverage) and some shift in the way of financing the welfare expenditures (the replacement of employee health care and unemployment contributions with a tax called Contribution Sociale Généralisée)
Nevertheless, the French Welfare State did not lose yet its main features: maximum protection for the insiders and Social Entitlements based on labour market participation, a participation is determining to profit from a complete retirement in a given mode. Moreover the corporatist system of insurance is still important : the professional statute determines the different schemes.
To conclude we could say that changing Welfare state features for both France and Sweden has been mainly due to a shift in political ideology. This assertion do not underestimate the economic and financial reasons which explain the necessity to implement reforms.
Among the symptoms of crisis, even Esping-Andersen in Welfare States in Transition. Social Security in the New Global Economy suggests that, “the effect of population ageing is exaggerated”[23]. The contributors are sceptical about the neo-liberal formula for reform, not only because it increases inequality but also because it does not address the growing need for an active social investment policy to ensure against entrapment in poverty or low-paid jobs.
However, that while this political and ideological shift[24] has had strong and very frequently adverse effects on social-policy developments, those effects vary widely from Sweden to France, with political institutions and choices always prominent among the reasons for such variation.
The French anti-liberal tradition as well conservatist than revolutionary slows down the neo-liberal process[25] whereas Sweden is less politically reluctant to carry out these reforms, because, these latter remain anxious to keep the fundamental values which are the heritage of its long Social democratic Welfare State tradition.
New risks of social polarization appear with the transformation of the economies, and in particular with the development of low-skilled and badly remunerated employment. To face these new risks, we should proposes to give up the static prospect which consists in relieving the current difficulties of the individuals to adopt a dynamic prospect which thinks the social problems in terms of trajectory of life.
Thinking the problem differently consists in considering welfare expenditures: not as a cost which would block competitiveness and slow down the economic growth, but as an investment which accompanies and supports the transition towards the “knowledge economy”.
The concept of embedded citizenship, which was so characteristic for the northern-tier conservative welfare states, is gradually replaced by a more individualized concept of active citizenship. ne cloud say it's a pitty, wld rather sa t's hstr.
[1] Setting National Priorities: The Next Ten Years by Henry Owen, Charles L. Schultze
[2] Pierre Rosanvallon : « la triple crise de l’Etat Providence »
[3] John Logue the Welfare State : victim of its success , deadalus automne 1979
[4] John Rawls A Theory of justice
[5] Palme, Joakim. 1994. Recent Developments in Transfer Income Systems in Sweden.
[6] Hessler R. M.; Twaddle A. C. Power and Change: Primary Health Care at the Crossroads in Sweden in Strategies for Primary Health Care by the Year 2000: A Political Economic Perspective
[7] David Arter Scandinavia today.
[8] P.Blomqvist The Choice Revolution: Privatization of Swedish Welfare Services in the 1990’s
[9] Legalès P., Palier B. (2002), « Introduction : l’économie politique en débat », L’Année de la
Régulation, vol 6.
[10] Michel Crozier Le Phénomène bureaucratique, Paris, Le Seuil, 1963
[11] Henry Steryniak et Pierre Villa : pour une réforme de la sécurité sociale
[12] Exit, Voice and Loyalty, 1970
[13] Thornqvist and Christer economic paradigms and health care in Sweden
[14] Richard B.Saltman and Casten Von Otter Reforming Swedish health care in the 1990s: The emerging role of ‘public firms’.
[15] Staffan Marklund, Paradise Lost? 1987
[16] The social democratic state : the Swedish model and the bureaucratic problem of social reforms 1996
[17] Magnus Falkehed le modèle suédois
[18] OriginaThe Choice Revolution: Privatization of Swedish Welfare Services in the 1990’s
[19] Lindbom, A, Dismantling the social democratic welfare model? Has the Swedish welfare state lost its defining characteristics?
[20] Bonoli, G., ‘The Politics of Pension Reforms’, Cambridge University Press,2000.
[21] Gosta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism.
[22] Berghmam Jozef Making It Work - The European Welfare State and Work Options for the Future.
[23] Gota Esping-Andersen Welfare States in Transition. Social Security in the New Global Economy
[24] M. Glatzer and D. Rueschemeyer (eds) Globalization and the Future of the Welfare State
[25] Pierre Rosanvallon Fondements et problèmes de l' "illibéralisme" français